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Abstract
In large public infrastructure projects, political risks due to the power imbalance between central and delivery 
agencies are often overlooked or underestimated. The primary motive of the delivery agency in distorting 
information for political gains should be deemed a risk that creates uncertainty for large projects planning the 
outcome. In this study, seven large infrastructure projects in the state of Victoria, Australia are examined through a 
workshop involving key stakeholders who had played active roles in these projects. The findings revealed that power 
asymmetry between central and delivery agencies exist and would lead to optimism bias, which in turn creates 
uncertainty and risk of overpromising in the business case. Power asymmetry exist in large infrastructure projects 
because the central agencies usually only have the responsibility but not the skill set needed to measure the 
robustness of the business case. These types of political risks are difficult to quantify and even detect. This paper 
recommends a few managerial strategies that have referential values and/or can be used to mitigate and circumvent 
this risk.
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1. Introduction
Risk assessment is an essential part of an 
organization’s strategic planning process. In aiming 
to achieve its strategic objectives, risk evaluation in 
the strategic planning process normally calls for some 
risk reporting taking into account normal and worst-
case scenarios. Managerial decisions are then formed, 
and a risk management framework developed to 
retain a “no surprise” project operation status. Risk 
evaluation is also a vital part of project portfolio 
selection when a project is appraised for the risk and 
value in comparison to other initiatives. Due to 
limited resources, only the best value for money 
should permit to proceed, and hence robust risk 
assessment is a critical step in short listing and 
choosing the projects for investment.
Risk can come in the form of external and internal 
risks. External risks are the risks caused by elements 
external to the organization such as economic 
downturns and natural disasters. Traditionally a 
special category of external risk known as political 
risks specifically, have been largely ignored and only 
considered informally by project managers. 
Examples of political risk include external disruptive 
behavior that can deeply affect project cost, time and 
performance. However, it was difficult to quantify
political risks due to their ever-changing nature.  A 
common practice for accounting this type of risks 
would be to use an activity-based costing technique 
that increases the variance while estimating the 
performance of the activities in the project. However, 
this method is not robust or sufficient; probabilistic 
risk analyses may be better options to deal with 
political risks.
The specific aim of this research is to explore and 
investigate political risks in large infrastructure 
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projects using cases of large Victorian public 
infrastructure projects as our basis for examination.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Accounting for Political Risks - Past Studies  
Previous research in this area includes the Neelum 
Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) (Kiani, 2014; 
Mukhtar, 2013). In this study, the authors tried to 
evaluate whether project managers working on large 
infrastructure projects in a volatile environment can 
have sufficient objective information in order to be 
able to utilize any form of risk modeling techniques.
The political risk is defined, in the study as any 
changes resulted from the hierarchy of control that 
alters the expected outcome and value of a given 
economic action by changing the probability of 
achieving business objectives. This massive 
infrastructure project is carefully chosen using 
Flyvberg’s (2016) argument that a carefully chosen 
experiment, case or experience can lead to the critical 
situation, where one case may be able to provide 
sufficient evidence to justify an argument. 
Neelum-Jhelum Hydro Power Plant (NJHP) is a 
run of the river hydroelectric generation project that 
is located in the vicinity of Muzaffarabad in the 
territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) in 
Pakistan. This megaproject diverts the Neelum river 
water through a tunnel, into a powerhouse and out 
into the Jhelum River. The project experienced 
significant delays, funding issues and political 
disputes with regards to the Indus River Treaty 
signed between India and Pakistan.
Based on the detailed project study and the 
specific project accounts, twenty political risk factors 
were found for the NJHP – some of which had 
caused an effect on the cost, time and performance. 
Objective project information was then obtained to 
model these risks using a probabilistic model. The 
probabilistic risk assessment utilized two core 
principles: the principle of decomposition and Bayes 
probabilistic principle. It was outside of the scope of 
this research to determine the presuppositions and 
conditional probability data for a full set of scenarios 
and the posterior probability of the identified risks. 
By implementing the probabilistic model and costs 
derived for each of the identified risks, a total amount 
of approximately $596 million USD was determined 
to be the impact of the identified risks on the $5 
billion USD project.
So were the managers able to obtain all the 
relevant objective data to run the probabilistic 
models? A closer look revealed that the majority of 
the information was derived from experts, who were 
on-site and had been on the project since its 
beginning.
An analysis of the impact of subjectivity in the 
data provided by experts showed that the 
probabilistic model loses its robustness and ability to 
assist project managers in real life – shown in the 
study by implementing a small change to conditional 
probabilities during the different design phases, 
resulting in a change of over $250 million USD of 
cost variance.
The answer to the research problem is that, 
although conditional and a priori, the probabilities 
were being determined with experts are at best a 
guess – simply due to the nature of political risks. 
The authors then went on to conclude that the vast 
majority of objective data, such as costs, delays and 
impacts can be obtained objectively for the use of a 
probabilistic model to predict the impact to a project 
from political risks, the requirement of conditional 
and prior probabilities from expert opinions cannot 
be considered objective data, resulting in a model that 
may or may not be entirely realistic.
2.2 Agency Theory Revisited
Agency theory (Mitnick, 1975) attempts to explain 
the relationship between principals (defined as the 
entity with control over resources and legitimacy to 
make a decision including approval of a proposed 
solution) and the agent or the contractors (defined as 
a delegate of the principal to perform a task). The 
agent is expected to have knowledge and skills to 
explore the need, identify the solution and implement 
the work with the highest value for the principal and 
is also supposed to offer a solution for principal’s 
approval. Eisenhardt (1989) provided an overview of 
the Agency theory by stating that principal-agent 
relationships should reflect efficient organization 
through information sharing and risk-bearing costs. 
Key assumptions are made about human nature being 
self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk aversion. 
The gap of information and incentive between 
principal and agent results in problems such as risk 
sharing, relationships with differing goals and risk 
preference. 
The focus of the theory is determining the most 
efficient contract governing the principal-agent 
relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., 
self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), 
organizations (e.g., goal conflict among members), 
and information (e.g., information is a commodity 
which can be purchased). Agency theory assumes the 
pursuit of self-interest at the individual level and goal 
conflict at the organizational level (March, 1962). In 
both perspectives, information asymmetry creates a 
power in the lower order participants (Pfeffer& 
Pettigrew, 1976). Agency theory is a kind of 
information processing approaches that assumes 
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 2017) 53–63
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
54
individuals are rational and that information is 
distributed asymmetrically throughout organizations 
contingency theory (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973; 
Lawrence &Lorsch, 1967). In political models, goal 
conflicts are resolved through bargaining, 
negotiation, and coalitions however in agency theory 
they are settled by the co-alignment of incentives 
using the price mechanism (Eisenhardt, 1989) or 
reward power in the contractual framework.
Agency theory is most relevant in situations in 
which contracting problems are difficult. These 
include situations in which there is (a) substantial 
goal conflict between principals and agents, such that 
agent opportunism is likely (e.g., owners and 
managers, managers and professionals, suppliers and 
buyers); (b) sufficient outcome uncertainty to trigger 
the risk implications of the theory (e.g., new product 
innovation, young and small firms, recently 
deregulated industries); and (c) unprogrammed or 
team-oriented jobs in which evaluation of behaviors 
is difficult (Eisenhardt, 1989). In some cases, it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is doing or whether the agent has behaved 
appropriately.
There is also a problem of risk sharing which 
arises when the principal and agent have different 
attitudes toward risk, and this results in different 
actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory broadened 
this risk-sharing literature to include the agency 
problem that occurs when cooperating parties have 
different goals and division of labor (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).
Researchers are divided on the usefulness and 
application of the Agency theory. Jensen (1983)
argued that agency theory provides an important 
foundation while others have argued that the theory 
address no clear problem, is narrow, lacks testable 
implications, and is dangerous (Perrow, Reiss, & 
Wilensky, 1986). Agency theory has been critiqued 
to having only a view of the world that ignores the 
complexity of organizations. Another view states that 
agency theory provides a unique, realistic, and 
empirically testable perspective on problems of 
cooperative effort (Eisenhardt, 1989).
2.3 Power
Being identified as a universal driver (Nietzsche, 
1968), Power is a fundamental concept in political 
science (Falkemark, 1982; Isaac, 1987). A common 
definition of power comes from the causal relation 
between two entities one desires to influence, and one 
is affected (Isaac, 1987). “Power is the ability of 
those who possess it to bring about the outcome(s) 
they desire” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). Such power 
could extend over a broad span of means and 
leverage embedded in an actor's potential activities, 
called power field (Kurt Lewin, 1935). According to 
Raven (1993), Lewin (1952) defines power as the 
ability to induce forces' of a certain magnitude on 
another and is a fundamental phenomenon to 
explicate actors’ behavior during interactions. Power 
is defined as the capacity to influence the conduct of 
others. It comes with exclusive access to resources 
less available to other e.g. access to information, 
knowledge, skills and expertise.
The classic theory of power identifies expert 
power, reward power, referent power, legitimate 
power, and coercive power as the basis of power 
(French & Raven, 1959). The model was then 
completed by informational power as the sixth bases 
of power (Raven, 2008). Power aims to explain the 
intention of the powerful in changing the behavior of 
others. It originates from information, knowledge, 
skills, expertise, and ability to reward/punishment, 
rightful position, reputation and force. Means of 
exertion of power are diverse and changes according 
to the base of power. 
Although the theories of power have been 
cultivated in the context of political science, it 
explains the means of compliance and influence in 
social systems (Dahl, 1957; Falkemark, 1982; Isaac, 
1987; Lukes, 1974). In behavioral compliance or 
‘Decisionist’ view “A has power over B to the extent 
that A can get B do something that B would not 
otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957). When power is viewed 
as a ‘Non-Decision’ Influence or an invisible 
influence (Szalai, 1997), there will be “mobilization 
of bias”. Bias emerges when something favors a few, 
but suppress others (Schattschneither, 1960).
“[mobilization of bias is] is a set of predominant 
values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures 
that operate systematically and consistently to the 
benefit of particular groups and persons at the 
expense of others” (Szalai, 1997).
Pfeffer (2005) also distinguishes power from 
authority. In his view, power suggests hard power 
that its exertion diminish it, while authority is a 
legitimate position that might even reinforce when 
applied (Pfeffer, 2005). It could be said that authority 
is a power sourced from legitimacy and strengthened 
by reward and punishment. Nevertheless, the classic 
theory of power identifies and clusters the origin of 
power that explains the influence of actors more 
cohesively that acknowledges the variety of bases of 
power. We take the classic theory of power as the 
cornerstone of our research.
Measurement of power is controversial and 
problematic as the precise measurement is not 
possible (Pfeffer, 2005). When used between a pair 
of entities, power is a relative term. It does not exist 
in solitude. That is to say, the power of a powerful 
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resonates with the perceived picture of others. In a 
relationship between a principal and an agent, the 
perimeters of their behavior will set the scope of 
power that each party might have over the other.  Not 
only the conduct of actors may severely change under 
observation, but a proper study also requires two sets 
of data for actor behavior when power exerted and 
when power not exerted that is hard to structure and 
collect.
2.3.1 Power in Project Delivery
In a project, stakeholders have a different level of 
influence to impact the project (Cleland & Ireland, 
2007). Stakeholder salience theory considers power 
an indicator of the stakeholder influence (Mitchell, 
Agle, & Wood, 1997). Kernaghan (1993) defines 
stakeholder relation to a project “a relationship 
involving sharing of power, work, support and 
information with others for the achievement of joint 
goals and mutual benefits”. The participants’ ability 
to influence the project decision-making process is 
laid in their power comprises proficiency as well as 
influence. 
The term ‘powerful’ in projects also implies 
competency, skillfulness, expertise, experience, 
qualification and adequacy. A knowledgeable 
consultant has an impact on a client, and a skilled 
contractor has the power to demand a higher price. In 
projects, power is not only perceived as the ability to 
change other’s decision but the competency that 
convinces others to comply. That is to say; power is a 
combination of authority and competency in project 
systems. 
A right mix of project people competency and 
motivation moreover to well-empowered project 
parties have a significant effect on success (Ayas, 
1996; Nagadevara, 2012). That is to say, participants’ 
power has a great role in project outcome through the 
effect it has on their communications and 
collaborations within the project that is reflected in 
their decisions.
The classic theory of power recognizes 
knowledge, skills, reputation, reward, legitimacy and 
coercion as origins of power. We try to map the six 
sources of power classic theory to authority and 
competency as the major pillars of power in projects. 
Authority resonate legitimacy, reward and fuels 
coercion power. On the other hand, competency 
relates to knowledge and skill power. It is rather 
puzzling how to associate reputation, as a source of 
power, with authority or competency. Reputation is 
not an actual characteristic but a perceived effect on 
others in a long-term collaboration. Reputation or 
referent power as means of influencing decision 
should be investigated in the context project delivery 
to explore cause and effects of any possible risk it 
may impose on the project actors’ behavior. 
2.3.2 The Concept of Power Asymmetry
There is a link between the utility of decisions and 
the cognition reflected in the level of knowledge and 
required resources to make an informed choice. 
Besides, there is no guarantee that the degree of 
authority and cognition in participants are in the 
balance when the opposite is suggested by literature 
when relates the irrationality to power (Flyvbjerg, 
1998). Power has been blamed for being the cause of 
optimism bias (Inesi, 2010; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 
2012), over-confidence (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & 
Galinsky, 2012), constraint ignorance (Lammers, 
Gordijn, & Otten, 2008), and lack of advice taking 
(See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011). Actors’ 
power in a project should be investigated as it 
originates the behavior and hence the quality of 
decisions.
Participants’ power is an undividable part of any 
project, and its role should not be overlooked in 
project success. While power is the ability to 
influence other’s decision, it is the capacity of one to 
fulfill the allocated task. Power asymmetry or 
imbalance exits when one party has more power than 
its working partners. In projects, a lack of in-house 
knowledge in public sector was a serious problem 
that contributes to time and cost overrun (Patel & 
Robinson, 2010). Competence is a collection of 
knowledge, attitude, skills, and experience needed to 
successfully perform a function (International Project 
Management Association, 2006). Participants have a 
different level of competency in a project. 
Inappropriate level of competency hinders effective
communication, cooperation and flexibility to 
change; new ideas are ignored, and collaboration is 
diminished. A possible extreme scenario is where 
project clients have supreme authority but inadequate 
resources to make an informed decision. The gap 
between participants’ authority and competency 
prevent an optimum utilization of resources or 
maximized decision. The outcome would be a 
‘limited’ decision (Sanderson, 2012) that occurs 
where either all options are not identified, or the best 
possible option is not preferred amongst them.
2.3.3 Power in Central Government and Delivery 
Agencies
Central agencies in government organizations 
typically only have executive powers to implement 
and enforce governmental decisions. Central agencies 
may or may not have the expertise to decide and the 
control of resources at the grassroots level or the 
delivery level. It is the essence of delegation process 
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that a principal asks agencies to do a task that 
requires ad-hoc skills and knowledge. The central 
agency finds it inefficient and burdensome to keep all 
the necessary resources in-house but instead, to 
breakdown the work and allocate it to delivery 
agencies. Nonetheless, in a delegation, an implicit 
form of influence exists within approval process. 
Informal power is thought to be held by delivery 
agencies due to the knowledge, expertise and referent 
power the delivery agency has over the central 
agencies that will influence the approval of the 
proposed business case. There is, therefore, an
element of exposure to the risk arising from the 
informal power that resides in these delivery 
agencies.
A closer look at the arrangement reveals that the 
power balance may influence information flow, 
decision making and dynamics between policy 
makers and project delivery team. While the central 
agencies use the business case as a means of 
evaluating the value of an investment proposal over 
other candidates, the robustness of the business case 
becomes important as it may influence the selection 
process. That is to say; delivery agencies may affect 
the content of business cases which is the primary 
form of information flow used for decision making. It 
is a critical risk if the business case may be made to 
look more optimistic to push the project through the
initial approval gates.
Power comes from the delivery agencies close 
interaction and engagement with two first groups of 
agents: (a) Users i.e. these are the people who finally 
use the infrastructure; (b) Market i.e. these are the 
individuals or groups who design, who constructs and 
who supplies parts and components to bring the 
project to fruition. The superior knowledge of a 
delivery agency of user’s requirements and market 
condition provide higher information power to 
delivery agencies in its communication with central 
institutions. Being close to the users and market 
brings a particular type of advantage in that the 
delivery can choose to withhold information from the 
agency or embellish the information or even to distort 
the information to their organization advantage or to 
enhance their positions. Although they are expected 
to act on behalf of the central agency, organizational 
need for survival and their ignorance of the 
government priorities of resource allocation may 
make them a bias toward their proposed business 
case. The approval process inevitably faces a risk of 
optimism in a proposed business case where the 
central agencies rely on a delegation process of 
delivery agencies prepare and propose a business 
case in line with government strategies. In effect, 
acting on behalf of a higher authority brings about the 
risk of optimism bias and over promising in proposed 
business case that might lead to opportunity loss or 
lesser value for money. 
3. Research Method
In the first part of this research, publicly available 
parliamentary interviews with experts from 
government and private sector were indexed and 
analyzed to find the current challenges in the delivery 
of public infrastructure. The analysis allowed the root 
causes of the current shortcomings to be uncovered. 
Grounded research method and case study are used to 
assess the risk of over-promising in Victorian 
infrastructure delivery.
We incorporated focus group discussions to 
capture the process of decision making in the 
different stages of a project. A focus group discussion 
was then organized. The participants for the 
workshop were drawn from the people from the 
public and the private sector in Victoria. The aim of 
the seminar was too organized to fine-tune and 
validate the previous findings. During the workshop, 
the identified challenges, causes, and 
recommendations are presented and discussed. The 
workshop was held in March 2015 at a convenient 
location at a University premise. Forty-four experts 
were contacted via telephone, 26 were formally 
invited, 19 expressed their interests, and finally, 17 
attended the workshop. Table 1.a shows the affiliated 
sector of the seminar delegates and Table 1.b depicts 
their depth of knowledge of the case study.
During the workshop, the experts’ feedback was 
collected in every step. At the same time, seven case 
projects were presented, and learning lessons are 
solicited. The workshop was conducted by a 
professional moderator. Specialized software was 
used to capture the Expert’s statements (recording 
was evaded to encourage candid disclosure of 
participants).
4. Findings
The workshop reviewed seven Victorian case 
projects. Project approval process is considered in a 
broader framework of central and delivery agencies. 
In an extension to the literature of organizational 
theories e.g. agency theory, the research splits up 
central and delivery agencies. It provides a better 
understanding of the current state of public 
procurement and highlights the existing 
organizational challenges such as asymmetry of 
power and conflict of incentives. The findings verify 
that underestimating the overpromising behavior of 
project delivery agencies during the planning stage of 
infrastructure is a critical risk that would impact the 
perception of success. It is postulated that the risk of 
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Table 1.The demography of the workshop delegates



















optimism bias could be attributed to the power 
balance of the participants. Power imbalance or 
asymmetry can be linked to the present shortcomings 
in public infrastructure by uncovering the people’s 
behavior within project processes.
Whereas the common understanding of the 
literature implies that success is an outcome of 
project performance according to the plan, the 
majority of participants, 58%, believe that success is 
mainly measured in the shadow of the initial 
expectations. More remarkably, 64% of experts find 
inflated expectations the leading cause of 
disappointment in projects. Optimism bias in 
planning the value and overpromising behavior of 
sponsors are the key factors in deterring a project 
from success. 
The findings also endorsed the risk of over-
ambitious decisions particularly those made of a 
business case. The quality of the business case is 
severely affected by client’s fallacy of initial 
estimations especially if exaggerated benefits or 
optimistic cost are prime considerations. Many other 
factors were also found to be a possible cause of the
over-promising behavior. The insufficient 
understanding of requirements, errant assumptions, 
inadequate technical knowledge, strategic 
misrepresentation and insufficient supervision are 
identified as leading factors that might cause a 
project bite off more than they can chew. The 
workshop outcomes confirm the initial hypothesis 
that the distribution of power among participants 
explains the risk of bias in preparing a robust 
business case.
Suboptimal decisions are partially attributed to 
the participants’ conflicting interests when concurred 
with asymmetrical power. There is a risk of over-
promising business case when resources are 
constrained and governed by central agencies, but the 
field knowledge of user requirements and market data 
rest with the delivery agencies. If the central agency 
is less informed of the decentralized project 
requirements, the risk becomes more severe. 
4.1 Informal Authority
In this research, the notion of informal authority is 
conceptualized to explain the agency’s referent 
power to manipulate and influence principal’s 
decision. Informal authority contrasts the formal 
authority, a known legitimacy power of an entity that 
possesses it lawfully as a form of authority to make a 
decision. In public delivery system, the central 
agencies have the formal authority because of their 
given position in the approval process such as 
gateway review. Central agencies allocate resources 
and control the progress. Conversely, informal 
authority is a tacit power possessed by an entity, 
usually a subordinate or a reporting organization. In 
other words, informal authority influences a formally 
authorized entity’s decision. In projects, the informal 
authority may originate from information, expertise 
or reputation power of an agency to manipulate other 
organizations’ behavior. Every time a business case 
is found trustworthy the reputation of the delivery 
agency increases. The more the reputation of the 
delivery agency, the more the informal authority due 
to the increase of reputation power. As a conclusion, 
the concept of informal authority is relevant to the 
organizational challenge of Victorian public delivery, 
and so it is embedded in the theoretical framework of 
our proposed theory.
4.2 Power and Optimism Bias
The intrinsic worth of power asymmetry theory is 
cross-checked against seven recent case projects in 
Victoria. These case studies are selected across the 
extreme range of performance. Through a series of 
questions, the participants evaluated the level of 
success whereas informal authority. 
Failure is measured through questioning the 
experts of the gap between expectations and 
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outcome. It shows a mix of perceived success and 
failure among the case studies. The popular projects 
in the eyes of experts are Convention Centre, 
Children Hospital, and Regional Rail Link. On the 
opposite, Myki, HealthSMART and Market 
Relocation are deemed disappointing; finally, 
Victorian Desalination is in limbo. 
It was found that informal authority exists among 
the central and delivery agencies. It is partly due to 
the governance structure frequently adopted in 
Australia where delivery agencies are delegated to 
communicate the field data. The role of central 
agencies is merely direct and audit. The information 
gap and distribution of skills among central and 
delivery agencies creates an informal authority for 
the delivery agencies that might create a risk to the 
project. It appears that if a delivery agency has an 
accurate understanding of the requirements, risks 
may be minimized; see Children Hospital. The 
contract structure of Children Hospital project is PPP 
(Public Private Partnerships) that allocate the risk of 
cost overrun and time delay to the private sector. The 
procurement strategy for this project plays an active 
role to provide a robust project estimation. A solid 
understanding of the project and user requirements 
provides unswerving information to the central 
agency to make a decision that preserves value for 
money. An adequate understanding of the 
requirements, make a client an informed buyer that 
profoundly contributes to project success. 
In the view of stakeholders and experts, the risk 
of informal authority and failure are connected. The 
correlation factor of 0.71 shows that the higher 
informal authority, the greater risk of a failure; see 
Figure 1.
The data shows that informal authority is not 
unavoidable nor does it always lead to a failure. 
However, it might be suggested that there is a 
threshold that beyond which the risk of manipulation 
is high and the disaster is probable e.g. Myki and 
HealthSMART. Within the threshold level, the 
central agencies' understanding of the requirements is 
a key to defusing the threat of informal authority.
Informal authority if not managed through 
another mechanism of informing the decision maker 
e.g. proper procurement strategy, will cause risk of 
failure. Among the case studies, those show high 
informal authority are ended with a perception of 
failure.
5. Discussion
5.1 Sense of Power Contribute to Optimism Bias
In our study of Victorian large infrastructure projects, 
we recognized the peculiar role of Central agencies
Figure 1. Informal Authority vs. Failure in seven Victorian 
infrastructures; Correlation factor = 0.71
that hold the formal authority and approved the 
funding for proposed project i.e. the Cabinet and the 
Treasury, or retrospectively audit project delivery 
process i.e. the Parliament and Auditor-General that 
provide specialized audit and reports to the central 
agencies. Central agencies make the final decision 
and tend to have an over-reliance on the delivery 
agencies for developing a business case. 
The delivery agencies, on the other hand, are 
expected to have field knowledge while being in 
relation with end users and market entities. They 
initiate or develop a business case for the central 
agencies that compete for the limited funding and 
approvals. The race for limited resources provokes 
informal authority that raises the power of the 
delegate in swaying the final decision. The 
relationships between the agencies are depicted in 
Figure 2.
The issue of informal authority introduces risk 
into the system as central agencies do not have the 
first-hand information and expertise. Emerging 
power is masqueraded in this informal authority as 
the delivery agencies now have influence over final 
approval decision through manipulating the quality of 
the business case. They have the power to make the 
business case optimistic and more appealing to the 
central agencies either intentionally in a strategic 
misrepresentation of swaying the approval process or 
unintentionally as a result of a psychological process 
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5.2 Uncertainties and Risks Arising
Uncertainty risk stems from one party holding more 
power and influences others. These results in the 
uncertainty (risk) those results in 1) an overpromising 
behavior and 2) under-delivering when constraints 
cannot be overcome. Due to the lack of knowledge 
and expertise, central agencies may not have a sound 
check and balance system in place as they cannot 
control due to not physically present all the time. 
Secondly, they are continually relying on the delivery 
agency for information and advice.
When the business case is made too optimistic 
due to a motivation of getting initial project approval 
and funding, the chance of approval increases. It 
leads to a kind of overpromising behavior which 
introduces uncertainty and risk where resources are 
limited, and investment opportunities substitute each 
other.
6. Managerial Implications and Significance of 
the Research
Projects with a known boundaries and accurate 
estimation models, such as buildings, are less risky 
than those of complex interfaces with latent 
conditions such as IT, earthworks, or unpredicted 
market demand. Furthermore, a delivery agency with 
an on-going stream of projects accumulates 
experiences and gets a true understanding of the user 
requirements. That might explain why a department 
that routinely delivers hospitals has a higher chance 
of being successful, even if it has a medium level of 
informal authority. Nonetheless, informal authority 
remains a threat for early stage decisions particularly 
if the delivery agency is not an informed buyer. Even 
a reliable and positive record of a delivery agency in 
fulfilling expected value for money is not enough to 
assure the central agencies as it raises the reputation 
of the delivery agency that sources informal 
Figure 2. Power fields of public agencies in infrastructures delivery systems.
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authority. A change in the approval process is 
required to deal with this uncertainty. 
To mitigate this risk, different strategies to 
manage participants’ risk of power asymmetry are 
proposed.  Three strategies are found more effective 
to control the risk of planning fallacy by balancing 
the participant power. These strategies are detailed in 
subsections 6.1 to 6.3 below.
6.1 State-wide Centre of Expertise
Lack of adequate expertise in the public sector is a 
danger in infrastructure delivery. Not only there are 
examples of the public sector being incompetent in 
addressing the proper requirements of a project, but 
there is also a growing concern for managing and 
preserving the existing corporate memory. 
Therefore, external expertise is preferred and 
called upon by the delivery agencies find outsourcing 
an efficient approach to access occasional skills. 
Consequently, lack of in-house expertise is more 
likely in the major one-off projects that require 
unique know-how normally non-existent in agencies’ 
skill set. 
Although it might not be efficient for every 
deliverer to keep a separate skill set, having a 
statewide center of excellence would be an answer 
that has been applied in other jurisdictions too e.g. 
Ontario, Canada as it engages in every large project 
on a frequent basis. A center of expertise is proposed. 
The aim of this center of expertise is to create 
knowledge, implement large projects, maintain public 
competency and accumulate the experience. Such a 
center will benefit delivery agencies as well as 
central agencies by providing a reliable benchmark in 
assessing the optimism in a business case.
6.2 Stable delivery pipeline
Although central public agencies have the authority, 
usually by people’s election, to direct public 
investments, they are political entities with political 
gain as the motive and incentive. The appetite for 
political gain is a pitfall that might be abused if a 
business case targets to stimulate it by overpromising 
that intrigues central agencies for a higher political 
weight. 
Public infrastructures are typically large, and their 
delivery cycle is likely to be lengthier than a political 
cycle. That is to say; a government might not last 
long enough to witness the end product of an 
incepted infrastructure. The longer life cycle of 
infrastructure delivery than political elections may 
create a risk of a government becoming bias toward 
early benefits of a project that could be projected as a 
political gain. Investment priorities and project 
pipeline are strategies to emphasize the long-term 
value of a project for the community. 
A steady delivery pipeline has the advantage of 
retaining public skills in-house or helps outsource it 
more efficiently. A delivery pipeline provides ample 
opportunity for stakeholders to engage and share their 
requirements. A qualified public agency with 
sufficient understanding of user requirement has a 
higher chance of success. This is also true in the 
private sector where a reliable schedule of 
infrastructure facilitate skills management is 
beneficial. Private sector being already informed of 
the project queue, organize the necessary resources. It 
collectively increases competition and eventually 
benefits the community.
Even though it is accepted that a delivery pipeline 
should be kept away from short-term political 
influence, the legitimacy of a long-term isolated 
pipeline is under question too. An elected 
government set forward to fulfill the people’s direct 
interests. It is easily conceivable that a plan of a 
voted government might be different to those of a 
long-term infrastructure pipeline. It remains to be 
investigated the optimum mechanisms of a 
government to influence the infrastructure pipeline.
6.3 Early Engagement of Stakeholder through 
financial Commitments
For some stakeholders, such as end users of an 
infrastructure, the first engagement might occur the 
first day of the project operation. That is to say; these 
secondary stakeholders feel no legitimate link, no 
urgency and no power to influence the project in the 
early days. Nonetheless, the impact they receive from 
the project is substantial. That might explain why 
social infrastructure is prone to create a controversy 
just close to the operation day. 
Early engagement of dormant stakeholders may 
stimulate streams of communication that assist 
transferring the stakeholder requirements when the 
cost of change is reasonably low. Users may have 
less incentive to engage since they underestimate the 
value of early decisions, and also they are not 
contractually bonded with no authority to raise a 
voice. Infrastructure users should be given an 
opportunity to express their expectations and advise 
their requirements. This objective is likely if the 
stakeholder has the right and need of engaging with 
project process. 
While fees traditionally start after the operation, 
infrastructure users might be summoned to discuss 
the payment regime long before the asset is delivered. 
A form of financial commitment ahead of product 
delivery would intrigue the stakeholder and attract 
Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, Vol. 7, No. 2 (July 2017) 53–63
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
61
their attention. This financial structure could be 
optimized to raise the voice of silent stakeholders. 
Scope and requirements might change in early 
stage, or the investment might fail the test of 
feasibility, the early financial engagement of the 
stakeholders should carefully avoid to inspire any 
sense of guarantee to the project team and to hold 
ready a mechanism of snap back. 
7. Conclusion
Governing a construction project includes many 
constituencies working together. Public projects are 
defined and proposed in the context of political 
interaction of government agencies and the private 
sector. Breaking down the government agencies into 
delivery agencies and central agencies may unravel 
the complexity of decision processes. The behavior 
of agencies in decision and approval process 
determines the quality of planning and ultimately the 
project outcome.
During the planning stage, a business case defines 
the project scope and conceptual design that affects 
the project perception of success in long term. While 
the quality of business case is the cornerstone of 
project success, optimistic plan often ends up with a 
perceived failure. The risk of influence over the 
approval process may hinder the government 
achieving the expected value for money.
Agency theory assumes an information and 
incentive gap between principal and delegates. The 
theory tries to explain shortcomings in the quality of 
early decisions when the agencies may not follow the 
interests of the principal as it would follow their own. 
In public infrastructure, early decisions are made by a 
business case that a delivery agency proposes to 
central agencies for review and approval. In the 
presence of misaligned objectives of agencies and 
unbalanced distribution of information, the delivery 
agency may manipulate the process in favor of its 
organizational preferences in preparing the business 
case such as scenario making and analysis, estimation 
of time and cost, identifying and analysis of project 
options, and selection of procurement strategy.
Power plays in any multiplayer settings. Power 
comes from an efficient access or exclusive control 
over relevant resources and is always a perceived 
concept rather than an absolute term. Principal’s 
power is the ability to align the agent’s action with 
the principal value vis-à-vis the Agent power is the 
ability to influence the principal decision. The classic 
theory of power identifies knowledge, skills, 
reputation, legitimacy, and force as sources of power. 
Authority and competence are the two axes of power 
in projects. Bringing the classic theory of power to 
the context of projects shows that reputation (or 
referent) is an informal power that emerges and 
develops in a long-term collaboration. We have 
proposed a concept of informal authority to explicate 
the risk of overpromising as a behavior that delivery 
agency exhibits during the approval process. In a 
visual framework that graphically illustrates the 
power field of project agencies, the dissimilar 
perspectives of central and delivery agencies are 
studied and the risks of making suboptimal decision 
investigated. It was observed that decision makers’ 
power balance is a significance contributor to the 
quality of early decisions.
In a dedicated workshop attended by project 
associates, we collected stakeholders’ perspective on 
seven infrastructure projects in the state of Victoria, 
Australia. The perception of failure and the informal 
authority are measured, and the correlation is 
indicated. Expectedly, informal authority exists 
across the case studies but remains benign when low 
or when the buyer is informed through other 
mechanisms such as procurement strategy. In the 
case of a significant informal authority, the risk of 
failure is high.
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